This article investigates the transnational behaviour of the children of immigrants -the second generation -in 11 European and two U.S. cities. We find evidence that transnational practices such as visits to the home country, remittances and use of ethnic media persist only among a minority of the second generation. At a personal level, these second-generation transmigrants are less socio-culturally integrated but more economically integrated in the host country. They also tend to live in those cities and countries with policies that are more assimilationist or exclusionary than multicultural.
While it is widely acknowledged that transnational practices usually remain an integral part of the life of first-generation immigrants (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007) , less consensus exists on the continuity of transnationalism across immigrant generations. Indeed, transnationalism is commonly defined in terms "by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement" (Glick Schiller et al. 2006:1) . The study of transnationalism through the second generation -defined here as individuals born in a given country with at least one immigrant parent -stretches the very meaning of the term. Yet because crossgenerational linkages to countries of origin are likely to be related to the level of integration of immigrant groups, it becomes important to know the extent to which such linkages persist among the children of immigrants.
This study examines transnational practices among the second generation in multiple European cities and in two major U.S. gateways -New York City and Los Angeles. The variety of immigrant groups permits us to examine how the level of integration -both economic and socio-cultural -relates to the persistence of transnationalism. The variety of cities in different countries permits consideration of the role of national and local context in structuring opportunities for transnational engagement. We will first explore the intensity and structure of transnational ties among second-generation men and women in European and American cities. Here we are mainly concerned with the manner in which the second generation maintains transnational ties, both with regard to the strength of the ties and the various ways in which these ties are interrelated. More specifically, we are interested in investigating patterns in the level and types of transnational ties and how the maintenance of those ties might vary by the nature of the local receiving context. Secondly, we will examine the effect of economic and socio-cultural integration on the level and types of transnationalism, and its variation according to the local context of reception. Hence, our research questions are the following: (1) How strongly and in which way do second-generation immigrants in Europe and the U.S. maintain transnational ties? (2) Do secondgeneration adults living in cities with distinctive immigrant contexts of reception differ in the level and types of transnationalism? (3) Among the second generation, is the level and type of transnational engagement associated with one's relative level of economic and socio-cultural integration? and if so (4) Does the magnitude and nature of the association between transnational engagement and dimensions of integration vary with differences in immigrants' contexts of reception?
Because the concept of transnationalism is so broad, it would be impossible to do complete justice to it in one study involving multiple surveys and contexts of reception. Rather, we attempt to give a flavour of transnational involvement along its economic, social and cultural dimensions, by measuring remittances, visits to the home country and ethnic media consumption. While an ideal study of transnationalism would utilise multiple indicators on each dimension to ensure content validity, we focus on three indicators that are present in our three surveys. We believe that these three indicators have face validity as indicators of transnational practices, as they have been mentioned as important indicators helping the preservation of ties to the parents' country of origin in existing research (Louie 2006; Kasinitz et al. 2002; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Rumbaut 2002) and are sufficient for an informative examination of the relationship between transnationalism and host-country integration. In fact, they seem particularly useful for examining the persistence of transnationalism across multiple countries and immigrant groups.
Background
At least part of the uncertainty over the persistence of transnationalism into the second generation centres on different views about what level of involvement constitutes a "transnational" (Lee 2008) . For instance, some believe that transnationalism continues across generations because later generations often live within a transnational social field. Immigrants' children are brought up in households where "social remittances" (ideas, norms, practices and identities) are present on a daily basis. They often marry someone from the same ethnic group; they are likely to participate in organisations of ethnic signature; they feel a sense of belonging to more than one nation or identify beyond national boundaries (such as religious identity); and so on (Eckstein & Barberia 2002; Espiritu 2003; Foner 2005; Fouron & Glick Schiller 2002; Pries 2005) . Others argue that it is precisely because of the predominance of these more local-host, emotional and symbolic ties to the country of origin that one may expect transnationalism to decline rapidly among immigrants' descendants (Alba & Nee 2003; Portes et al. 2009; Zhou 1997) . To address the deadlock between the two sides, new terms reflecting different subtypes of transnationalism and transmigrants have been introduced over time. As an example, to distinguish individuals who retain complex ties with people and institutions in the homeland from those who participate in more attenuated transnational practices, Levitt and colleagues use the terms "comprehensive" and "selective" transnationalism (Levitt et al. 2003: 570) . Moreover, they compare people who are "intensively transnational" with those whose transnational practices are "periodic" or "occasional".
Scholars also disagree over the relationship between "host" country integration and "origin" country orientation. Assimilation theorists (Gordon 1964; Warner & Srole 1945 ) predict a negative association between the two. Immigrants and their descendants will gradually assimilate into the mainstream way of life, from which a decline in transnational ties will follow. Conversely, the maintenance of economic, cultural and social ties with the origin country represents a manifestation or logical outflow of their inability or unwillingness to integrate. Others believe that integration and maintaining transnational ties are rather complementary, at least so in the case of economic integration; being economically successful increasingly enables immigrants to maintain ties with the origin country, such as through remitting money, setting up enterprises, visiting family and civic participation in origin countries. Some empirical studies support this latter prediction. Portes (1999) asserts that transnational orientations and activities are generally positively associated to integration of both parents and their children, and can facilitate successful adaptation by providing opportunities for economic mobility and (transnational) entrepreneurship (see also Granovetter 1995; Portes et al. 2002) . In the studies of Taylor (1999) and Van Dalen et al. (2005) , remittances appear to increase with immigrants' wages and employment, respectively. Guarnizo et al. (2003) find that increased education of immigrants increases political participation in receiving and origin countries. Hence, there are ways in which integration in the economic spheres can be positively related to transnational behaviour, with quite distinct end products. Socio-cultural integration may operate differently. While one would not expect an immigrant group that is socio-culturally assimilated to the host country to maintain many transnational practices, an immigrant group may be able to straddle the cultures of both countries and still feel reasonably integrated so long as the host country is receptive to multiculturalism.
Insight into above-mentioned transnational issues, however, is far from complete. This partly has to do with the method and scope of prior research. The majority of previous studies have been qualitative in nature (ethnographic studies) and primarily focused on specific aspects of transnationalism among (a particular group of) first-and/or second generation immigrants. Lacking is a body of empirical research that uses population-based survey data in order to estimate the prevalence of transnational engagement among the adult children of immigrants (for exceptions see Kasinitz et al. 2002 and Rumbaut 2002) . Consequently, hypotheses emerging from ethnographic fieldwork on the second-generation concerning the relationships between context of reception, incorporation and transnational engagements remain untested.
Perhaps even more important is the predominance of North American studies on the transnational lives of second-generation immigrants and the national scope of the few European studies, despite calls of pioneering migration researchers for more crosscountry comparisons (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Portes 1999) . This is a severe deficiency, as great differences exist in the migration history and main immigrant groups between and within the countries and cities of Europe and the U.S., respectively. Moreover, states are critical actors in shaping the options for transnational behaviour (Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004) . The distinction between countries with a multicultural tradition (e.g. the U.S. 1 and Sweden) and those characterised by policies of differential exclusion (e.g. France) or assimilation (e.g. Germany), seems to be relevant in this respect (Castles & Miller 2009 ). In countries with a predominantly multicultural approach, neither economic nor socio-cultural integration is necessary for immigrants to enjoy the same individual rights as the host population, including access to welfare state benefits and services. Moreover, as cultural diversity is respected and the identity of immigrant communities is protected in these countries, maintaining strong transnational ties is not an impediment for societal engagement and integration. This stands in sharp contrast with countries with a differential exclusion or assimilation approach, where giving up their interest in the country or origin, culture, language and customs, and adopting the mainstream ones are prerequisite for labour force participation, which in turn, gives access to welfare and other rights. In other words, both the material and non-material costs of maintaining transnational ties are higher and integration and transnationalism may be more strongly related to one another in the countries with the latter policy than in countries with a more multicultural approach.
Given the above, we hypothesise that although transnational behaviour is present among a non-negligible part of the secondgeneration (H1), it is: H1a: rather selective than comprehensive (i.e. including only a few transnational aspects rather than the whole range of aspects under study); and H1b: less pronounced in cities with a predominant differential exclusion or assimilation approach than in cities with a more multicultural approach.
With regard to the effect of economic and socio-cultural integration on the level and types of transnationalism, and its variation according to immigrant contexts of reception, we expect the level and types of transnational behaviour among the second generation to be negatively related to the level of integration (H2), but that: H2a: this relationship will be much less pronounced (and perhaps even reversed) in the case of economic integration, since one cannot send remittances without having money to remit; and H2b: these tendencies will be more pronounced in cities with a predominant differential exclusion or assimilation approach than in cities with a more multicultural approach.
Data
To test these hypotheses, we used three major surveys of the adult children of immigrants carried out in cities across Europe and counties in the greater New York and Los Angeles metropolitan areas: The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES; Crul et al. 2012) , the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY; Kasinitz et al. 2008 ) and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA; Rumbaut et al. 2004) .
The TIES survey, covering 15 European cities in eight countries 2 , focused on the lives of second-generation young adults of Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian descent compared with the ones of the majority population (i.e. native-born individuals with nativeborn parents -the comparison group). The countries and cities were selected on the basis of ethno-racial segregation and contrasting immigration, naturalisation and (local) integration policies so that respondents would reflect a wide spectrum in policy contexts. The immigrant group(s) included in city-specific samples varied by aggregate, usually depending on the predominant group(s) in the individual countries. Turks and Moroccans are the target groups in the Netherlands and Belgium; Turks and former Yugoslavs are the target groups in Germany, Austria and Switzerland; Turks are the target group in France and Sweden; and Moroccans are the target group in Spain.
Cross-section surveys were conducted using various means of sampling and interviewing methods. Despite difficulties in sampling the target group in some countries, 9,771 individuals aged 18-35 were sampled and interviewed between 2006 and 2008. The targeted sample size was 10,000, or 250 respondents per citygroup. Response rates varied by city-group: close to 22% in the German cities for the second generation of former Yugoslavian descent; close to 50% in the Swiss cities for both second-generation groups in question; and close to 70% in Linz for the second generation of Turkish descent. Even if quite low in some instances, these response rates appear to be similar to those found in other surveys of respondents of immigrant origin and do not appear to be a big source of bias (for more details, see Groenewold & LessardPhillips 2012) . The analyses presented in this article do not include the comparison groups and exclude the samples collected in Spain and Belgium due to incomparable education data and restricted access to the data, respectively, yielding an analytical sample of 4,486 observations across 11 cities in six countries. The sample is further reduced to 3,641 because of missing values on relevant variables. Post-stratification weights were created based on the age-sex distribution of the groups at the city level and are used in the analyses. West Indians and Russian Jews. The final response rate of the survey was 53.2%. Unlike the European (TIES) dataset, the New York sample did not restrict itself to the second generation. Besides those born in the United States to parents who migrated after 1965, foreign-born children of immigrants who arrived the United States up to 12 years of age and grew up in the United States (the so-called 1.5 generation), were also included in the survey. Like the TIES data, ISGMNY also contains two comparison groups consisting of 3 rd + generation whites and blacks, respectively, in the same age range. Our analyses, however, are restricted to the 2 nd generation sample (N = 1,545), consisting of 1,372 adult children of immigrants after listwise deletion of observations with missing data on relevant variables. This sample was weighted so that each immigrant group was proportional to its share of the total New York metropolitan population.
The IIMMLA project included a survey of a representative sample of adults, aged 20-40 years in the five-county region of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area, that is, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura. The telephone survey was carried out in 2004, and included an oversample of the 1.5/2 nd generation adults from six national-origin groups that comprise the bulk of the immigrant population in Los Angeles -Mexicans, Salvadorans/Guatemalans, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese and Filipinos. In addition, IIMMLA includes two residual 1.5/2 nd generation groups -all "non-white" persons with a national-origin other than one of the six largest immigrant groups and persons of other background identified as non-Latino and white -and two 3 rd + generation non-Latino white and black comparison groups. In total, 4,655 survey interviews were completed and the response rate was 55.6%. For this study, we limit our analysis to the sample of 2 nd generation adults (N = 2,083), and after listwise deletion of all observations with missing data on relevant variables, the final analytical sample includes 1,818 2 nd generation adults in Los Angeles. Analyses conducted subsequent to the collection of both the IIMMLA and ISGMNY surveys found only negligible differences between the respective samples and independent Census estimates with respect to age, gender and race/ethnicity.
To conduct the analyses the selected European countries samples were merged into one data set and New York and Los Angeles were merged into a second data set. The two data sets were analysed separately as the indicators of transnationalism and the measures of several independent variables were scored differently, making pooling of the European and U.S. data questionable. Given the emphasis on the impact of policy regime, the participating European countries 5 with a more multicultural approach (Sweden and the Netherlands) were distinguished from those with a more differential exclusionist or assimilation approach (Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France).
Despite the fact that New York and Los Angeles are today two of the largest immigrant gateways in the world, meaningful distinctions can be drawn between them owing to the broad consensus among scholars that New York is a uniquely welcoming receiving context for immigrants (Foner 2007; Waldinger 1996) . Several reasons have been advanced for this including New York's long history of receiving immigrants, the city's rich cultural diversity, generous local social policies and programmes, and its system of ethnic politics and ethnic-specific institutions (Glazer & Moynihan 1970) . Recent research using TIES, ISGMNY and IIMMLA has shown that second-generation adults in New York enjoy more integration pathways and higher levels of integration than their counterparts in Los Angeles and the same holds when comparing cities with multicultural incorporation regimes in Europe to those with more assimilationist-focused reception policies (Bean et al. 2010) .
3
Available information in the three surveys was compared in order to derive a set of indicators of transnationalism and economic and sociocultural integration that are as much as possible similar in content, if not in scale, across the surveys, using indicators outlined by current research. The total set of European and American indicators used to derive our measures of transnationalism and integration are described below. Descriptive statistics of the transnationalism indicators are reported within each type of reception regime, and for Europe and the U.S. as a whole, in Table A1 in the appendix.
Transnationalism
The TIES-survey included a number of questions aimed at capturing respondents' attachments to their parents' country of origin. With regard to economic ties, the respondents were first asked whether they had sent money to the country of birth of their parents in the past five years. Those who did so were subsequently asked about the amount of remittances (in classes, from less than 500 Euros to more than 2,000 Euros). Based on this information, the variable "remitting" was created, ranging from 0 (no remittances) to 4 (more than 2,000 Euros). Insight into social ties was gathered by asking the respondents how many times they visited their parents' country of origin in the last five years. The answers of the "visiting" question range from 0 (never) to 6 (several times a year). Finally, as a measure of cultural transnationalism, the respondents were asked whether they watched "ethnic media" (TV stations), with the answer categories: 0 = watching only survey country speaking stations, 1 = watching as much survey country as ethnic group speaking stations, 2 = watching mostly ethnic group speaking stations and 3 = watching only ethnic group speaking stations.
Three corresponding items measuring transnationalism were selected from both the IIMMLA and ISGMNY surveys. Both surveys asked second-generation respondents about the frequency with which they remitted money to their parents' home country. These variables were recoded so that they range from 1 (never) to 5 (weekly). The two surveys also asked about the number of visits made to parents' home country as an adult, and the recoded measure used in the analysis ranges from 0 (never) to 10 (ten or more visits). Finally, the measure of the frequency of exposure to ethnic-specific media ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (daily).
Integration
The level of economic and socio-cultural integration at the individual level was derived from principal components analysis (PCA), a method allowing us to verify whether chosen indicators measure one underlying latent concept. PCA allows us to reduce data and focus on the impact of economic and socio-cultural integration per se rather than that of individual indicators. To ascertain the numbers of dimensions, we used an eigenvalue greater than 1.10 as a cutoff criterion (Jolliffe 2002) . The interpretation of the factor scores are as follows: the higher the factor score, the more the second-generation respondent was economically/socio-culturally integrated. Different indicators were used to construct the scores and are described below. The rationale behind the choice of indicators and construction of the scores is based on Bean et al. (2010) . The indicators showed that two clear latent variables were present, which correspond to the realms of economic and socio-cultural integration. The means of the factor scores for each type of reception regime, and for Europe and the U.S. as a whole, are shown in Table A2 in the appendix.
Economic integration
In TIES, the following indicators were used to derive the level of economic integration of the respondents: (1) Education, measuring the respondents' highest level of educational attainment. National qualifications were transformed into harmonised educational codes, ranging from 0 (primary school graduation) to 4 (completion of tertiary school), in order to make educational attainment comparable across countries; (2) Occupational prestige, coded according to the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI, range: 16-88; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996) of occupational status. For those not currently working, the mean ISEI-score by country of residence, immigrant group and gender was imputed; and (3) Perceived difficulties with income (i.e. to make ends meet). This was measured via a scale running from 0 (great difficulties with income) to 4 (comfortable). This subjective variable was chosen, given that the income variable in the TIES data was categorical (respondents were asked to indicate in which category their income falls rather than their exact income) and included many missing values.
In ISGMNY and IIMMLA, the level of economic integration was calculated slightly differently, using the following indicators: (1) Education, measured by years of schooling; (2) Whether the respondent had employer-provided health insurance (dichotomous variable); and (3) Personal income, measured by the natural log of annual individual income.
Socio-cultural integration
In TIES, the level of socio-cultural integration was constructed using the following variables: (1) Self-measured proficiency in the language of parents' country of origin, ranging from 0 (excellent) to 5 (bad); (2) Use of the language of parents' country of origin in family setting, running from 0 (always using the language of parents' country or origin) to 1 (always using the language of the country of residence) 6 ; and (3) Frequency of religious attendance, running from 0 (one or more times a week) to 4 (never).
7
In ISGMNY and IIMMLA, the level of socio-cultural integration was calculated using the following indicators: (1) A dummy-coded variable indicating one's acceptance of exogamous marriage (i.e. the respondent did not agree with the statement that people should marry within their own ethnic group); (2) Language loss: whether the respondent did not speak the parents' native language well (dummy-coded); (3) Use of language at home: whether English was
Indicators of transnationalism and integration
the preferred language at home (dummy-coded); and (4) Religious attendance: whether the respondent attended religious services fewer than two times a year (dummy-coded).
Analytical approach
Our analyses were carried out in a number of steps. We first performed PCA of the transnationalism indicators defined above, within Europe and the U.S. separately. These analyses were used to compute a "transnational engagement" score for each secondgeneration individual in each country-sample, which served as our composite measure of the level of transnational engagement. We then used the standardised value of each transnationalism indicator in an average-linkage cluster analysis (country-specific), which groups second-generation individuals into groupings based on their level of transnational engagement with respect to remitting, visiting and ethnic media exposure. The country specific-groupings resulting from the cluster analyses defined types of transnational engagement. Finally, we estimated multivariate models (ordinary least squares (OLS) in the case of levels; logit (US) and multinomial logit (Europe) in the case of types) to assess the relationships between integration and policy regime, respectively, and transnationalism.
The multivariate models included several control variables that we expect would influence transnational engagement (for descriptive statistics of the control variables within each type of reception regime, and for Europe and the U.S. as a whole, see Table A2 in the appendix). Existing qualitative research suggests that immigrant and second-generation women have fewer motivations to engage transnationally, especially when the home country is structured by considerably less equitable gender relations than the host society (c.f. de Haas & Fokkema 2010; Grassmuck & Pessar 1991; Hirsch 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Smith 2006) . We thus included a dummy-coded "gender" variable in the multivariate models (male = 1). The models also included "age", measured in years, in order to capture potential variation in transnational engagement over the life-course. Furthermore, we expect that second-generation individuals who have a spouse or partner of the same ethnicity and generational status to have greater tendencies toward transnational engagement; having a spouse or partner with a shared ethnic background will increase the likelihood to continue ties with the parents' country of origin, although one could argue that the causality runs in the opposite direction. This tendency was captured by "partner status" using a series of dummy-coded variables comparing individuals with a same-ethnicity, first-generation spouse/partner; those with a same-ethnicity second-generation spouse/partner; those with a native/3 rd or later generation spouse/partner or of a different ethnic background, respectively, to unmarried/unpartnered individuals (the reference category). Partnership status was not included as an indicator of transnationalism because we could not establish a rationale for the relationship between being single (the reference group) and transnational behaviour. Transnational activity is also likely a function of "geographic proximity" to the home country (for example, if travel is more affordable and ethnic media more prevalent for second-generation immigrants from less distant origin countries). Proximity was measured using a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for respondents in the U.S. surveys whose parents migrated from countries in the western hemisphere. In Europe, where the argument for proximity does not hold as well as in the U.S. case given the selected immigrant groups, the variable "Turkish-origin" was constructed given that they are the main group present in all cities and that the Turks have quite a strong history of sustained guest worker migration than the other two other immigrant groups.
Results

Level and types of transnational behaviour
To answer the first research question -How strong and in which way do second-generation immigrants in Europe and the U.S. maintain transnational ties -PCA was firstly carried out to examine whether one latent, transnationalism dimension (component) could be extracted from the indicators outlined in the previous section. The PCA of both the European and American data show that, in fact, these indicators measure only one latent dimension of transnationalism. The factor loadings (presented in Table 1 ) show that our chosen indicators strongly determine transnational behaviour; all factor loadings are 0.5 or higher. Based on the factor loadings, each individual was assigned a transnational score (regression scoring was used to calculate the scores): the higher the score, the higher the level of transnational behaviour.
The last row of Table 1 shows that, in the European cities, second-generation respondents in the countries with a predominant differential exclusion or assimilation approach (DEA countries) have higher transnational scores than their peers in the multicultural cities, contrary to the hypothesis that cities with multicultural regimes foster greater levels of transnational engagement than those with a differential-exclusionist or assimilationist approach to receiving immigrants (H1b). This hypothesis is supported in the American context, however, where the New York second generation reports higher levels of transnational engagement than their counterparts in Los Angeles.
Next, in order to determine the types of transnational behaviour present in our data, average linkage cluster analyses were performed to classify second-generation immigrants into a number of groups with similar transnational behaviour. The groups resulting from the cluster analyses and their level of the mean score for each indicator are presented in Table 2 . The Calinksi-Harabasz stopping rule (Calinski & Harabasz 1974) , as available in the cluster stop command in Stata, was used to determine the number of groups in the cluster analysis.
The table clearly shows that the groupings resulting from the cluster analyses are different for the European and American cities. In the European case, three types of transnational behaviour were uncovered by the cluster analysis. The first group, by far the largest (80.8%), are the least engaged transnationally: the individuals belonging to this group are characterised by low levels of transnational behaviour across all indicators. The second group (15.5%) shows high levels of ethnic media use but mid-level involvement in terms of actual visiting and remitting; they might be said to be engaged in selective transnationalism. Individuals in the third group have high levels of social ties and remittances, but lower levels of ethnic media use. The prevalence of this group, however, is small in the European second-generation sample. Only 3.7% of the second-generation young adults of Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian descent have more comprehensive transnational ties. Hence, in the European case, where low levels of transnational engagement appear to be the rule, transnational ties appear to be more selective than comprehensive, which is in conformity with H1a.
By contrast, the cluster analysis of the pooled U.S. sample suggests that second-generation adults exhibit an "all or nothing" pattern of transnational engagement. Among the American respondents, 89% has little or no involvement with their parents' country of origin in terms of remitting, visiting or exposure to ethnic-specific media. The 11% who engages transnationally do so at a high level on all three measures.
Overall, the second-generation samples in Europe and the U.S. are similar in that only a small fraction, between 10% and 15%, are transnationally engaged, a finding that accords with prior estimates derived from other data sources (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Rumbaut 2002) .
5.2
To explore the determinants of the level and types of transnational behaviour -with special attention to the impact of policy regime and the level of economic and socio-cultural integration -stepwise multiple linear (level) and (multinomial) logistic (types) regression analyses were performed. Tables 3 and 4 present the results of these analyses. In Model 1, the main effects of policy regime (with multicultural (Europe) and New York (US) as reference group) and the level of economic and socio-cultural integration are included, together with the following control variables: gender, age, partner status and ethnic group membership (for Europe) and proximity to the home country (for the US). Model 2 incorporates the two-way interaction between policy regime on the one hand and economic and socio-cultural integration on the other hand.
Looking first at the control variables in Model 1 of Table 3 , respondents' gender and age have no effect on the level of transnationalism. The ethnicity and nativity of one's spouse or partner is significantly associated with the level of transnational engagement among the European and U.S. second generation. Compared with their unmarried/unpartnered counterparts, secondgeneration adults with a foreign-born spouse or partner with a shared ethnic background have higher levels of transnationalism, whereas those with exogamous relationships are less transnational. The latter, however, is only significant in the European case. No differences in transnationalism scores are found between those with a second-generation same ethnicity spouse or partner and their single counterparts. Second-generation transnational engagement is further determined in large part by ethnic group membership (for Europe) -the Turkish second generation reports higher transnational scores than its non-Turkish peers -and origincountry proximity (for the U.S.) -where the second generation from the western hemisphere reports higher transnational scores. Secondary analyses (not reported) show that the Turkish second generation in Europe has higher levels of remittances and ethnic media use but lower levels of home country visiting. In the case of the United States, the proximity difference is driven by substantially lower levels of ethnic media usage and less frequent home country visiting among those with origins outside the western hemisphere. The previously observed and unexpected finding of a negative relationship between the multicultural indicator and the level of transnational engagement in the European case persists even when other variables are taken into account, as does the previously observed and expected positive relationship in the U.S. case. Among second-generation adults in both Europe and the United States, one's level of transnational engagement decreases significantly in proportion to one's level of socio-cultural integration while a positive association is observed between level of economic integration and transnational engagement, both in line with our hypothesis (H2a). The strength of the economic integration relationship to transnational engagement, though significant, is modest in comparison with that of socio-cultural integration. All else equal, the transnational engagement score decreases by about four-tenths (Europe) and one-quarter (US) of a standard deviation with each standard deviation increase in the socio-cultural integration factor score.
Determinants of the level and types of transnational behaviour
We did not find significant regime-by-integration interactions in the U.S. case (Model 2), but did so in the European case and these interactions are in the expected direction (H2b). The level of transnational engagement does not grow as fast for the more economically integrated second-generation adults in the multicultural European cities as for their counterparts in the DEA European cities. With regard to the level of socio-cultural integration, whereas the second generation in the DEA cities reports higher transnational scores at low levels of socio-cultural integration than their peers in the multicultural cities, at higher integration levels they are the ones reporting lower transnational scores. These findings suggest that multicultural cities in Europe foster lower levels of transnationalism for the more economically integrated, whereas this regime type has less impact on the transnational engagement of the socio-culturally integrated. In other words, in the European case, multicultural settings allow the second generation to retain the ties to the parents' country of origin to a greater extent than in the DEA cities, regardless of their level of socio-cultural integration.
Overall, the variables included in the linear regression analyses explain 25% (Europe) and 21% (US) of the variance in the level of transnational engagement.
Results from (multinomial) logit models predicting inclusion in either the selective or comprehensive transnational group among the European second generation and the highly transnational group among the American second generation, respectively, are reported in Table 4 .
Interesting gender effects are found in the case of Europe. While we did not find a gender difference in the level of Europe (N = 3,641) US (N = 3,190) Model: 1 2 1 2 transnational engagement, men appear to be more likely to be in the comprehensive transnational group, while women are more likely to be in the selective transnational group. Contrary to what was found with regard to the level of transnational engagement, age has a significant impact on the type of transnational behaviour second-generations adults in Europe exhibits. Older individuals are less likely to be part of the selective transnational group. They are, however, more likely to be in the comprehensive transnational group. No gender and age effects are found in the U.S. case. The effects of partnership are mostly in line with previous results. Having a first-generation spouse or partner makes it more likely for secondgeneration individuals to be in any of the two transnationally engaged groups (Europe) and in the highly transnational group (US). Having an exogamous relationship only lowers the likelihood of being in the selective transnational group in case of Europe. Their likelihood of being in the comprehensive transnational group (Europe) and the highly transnational group (US) does not diverge from the one of single second-generation adults. Finally, second-generation adults of Turkish origin in Europe are more likely to be part of the transnational groups than their non-Turkish peers, especially the selective transnational group. In the U.S. case, membership of the highly transnational group is determined in large part by proximity to the homeland. With regard to the influence of local policy regime, we see a further confirmation of the general unexpected negative effect of a multicultural approach on transnational behaviour among secondgeneration adults in Europe. Those living in a multicultural city are not only reporting lower transnational scores but they are also less likely to belong to the two transnational groups. This is in sharp contrast with the situation in the United States. Though the overall Europe (N = 3,641) US (N = 3,190) Model level of transnational engagement is higher among New Yorkers, the second generation in Los Angeles is significantly more likely to be in the highly transnational cluster.
Control variables
Gender
In line with the level of transnational engagement and our expectations, socio-cultural integration lowers the likelihood of belonging to any of the two transnational groups (Europe) and is inversely related to being in the highly transnational group (US). The level of economic integration, on the other hand, does not have an impact on whether or not being a member of the distinct types of transnational behaviour. No significant regime-by-integration interactions are found in the U.S. case. However, similar to the level of transnational engagement in the European case, the impact of integration, especially socio-cultural integration, varies according to the regime type. While the more economically integrated individuals in multicultural European cities are less likely to exhibit fully transnational behaviour, especially at higher levels of socio-cultural integration multicultural regimes seem to allow for the preservation of transnational ties.
A final notable contrast between the European and American results is the explained part of the variance in the types of transnational behaviour by the variables included in the (multinomial) logit analyses: 18 and 6%, respectively.
Conclusion and Discussion
Our main aim was to explore the mere presence and types of transnational behaviour among the second generation in selected European and American cities. The data came from three major surveys: TIES -a survey among second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavs aged 18-35 years in several European countries -ISGMNY -a survey of the second generation aged 18-32 years from the largest immigrants groups in (counties in) the New York metropolitan area -and IIMMLA -a survey among second-generation adults aged 20-40 years residing the five-county region of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area.
The data have shown that significant transnational engagement among the second generation is infrequent, engaged in by only about 20% of the European sample and 10% of the two U.S. samples, a finding that is consistent with existing research on transnationalism among the second generation showing the periodical and occasional nature of transnational behaviour (Ambrosetti et al. 2011; Kasinitz et al. 2002; Lee 2007; Rumbaut 2002) . Transnational engagement was strongly associated with the nativity and ethnicity of one's spouse or partner and ethnic group membership (for Europe) -the Turkish second generation reported higher transnational scores than their Moroccan and former Yugoslavian peers -and proximity to the home country (for the U.S.) -where the second generation from the western hemisphere also reported higher transnational scores. The level of transnationalism was further strongly associated with sociocultural integration and, to a lesser extent, economic integration. As expected, being successfully integrated in socio-cultural terms resulted in least transnational behaviour, while stronger transnational engagement was found among the more economically integrated second-generation adults. Immigrant contexts of reception also did play a role. Second-generation adults in the highly multicultural city New York did report higher levels of transnational engagement. However, counter to common belief, the second-generation adults in the more DEA cities in Europe exhibited higher levels of transnationalism.
In the European case, two types of transmigrants could be distinguished -those characterised by either selective or comprehensive transnational behaviour, with a greater number of individuals belonging to the first type. Although no gender differences were found in the level of transnational engagement, men exhibited higher levels of comprehensive transnational behaviour, whereas women more often belonged to the selective transnational behaviour. Furthermore, second-generation adults in Europe did not only report higher transnational scores on average but were also more likely to belong to one of the transnational groups.
The structure of transnationalism among the U.S. second generation differs from that observed among their European counterparts. Transnational behaviour in the U.S. is more bifurcated than in Europe. While most of the U.S. second generation does not engage transnationally whatsoever, those who do tend to engage in all aspects -remitting, visiting and ethnic media consumption -at high levels. This bifurcation tendency is more pronounced in Los Angeles. Thus, second-generation adults in New York reported significantly higher levels of transnational engagement, but were less likely than their counterparts in Los Angeles to be classified as highly transnational. This pattern is consistent with expectations about how local immigrant receiving contexts may shape secondgeneration transnational behaviour. To the extent that New York is a more inclusive environment than Los Angeles, second-generation adults there may not perceive normative restraint with respect to transnational engagement, thus yielding a more varied distribution in the level and type of transnational behaviour. That the second generation in Los Angeles displayed an all-or-nothing pattern of transnational engagement may result from a "reactive" form of ethnic identity that is predicted to arise in negative contexts of reception (Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Portes & Zhou 1993) . While this line of theorising certainly requires more empirical testing, it points to the possibility that the individual motivations producing patterns of second-generation transnational engagement may vary depending on the local receiving context. 
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